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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
TYSON D. CLEMENTS,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
____________________________________)

NO. 45736
MADISON COUNTY NO. CR 2015-114
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
When he was nineteen years old, Tyson D. Clements pleaded guilty to felony sexual
abuse of a child under the age of sixteen (16) years. The district court imposed a unified
sentence of fifteen years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. After Mr. Clements
participated in a “rider,” the district court suspended the sentence and placed him on probation
for a period of ten years. Mr. Clements later admitted to violating his probation, and the district
court revoked his probation and executed his underlying sentence. On appeal, Mr. Clements
asserts the district court, when it revoked his probation, abused its discretion by executing his
underlying sentence rather than retaining jurisdiction.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Clements reportedly touched the privates of a twelve-year-old female on multiple
occasions. (See Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3.)1 In an interview with a Madison
County Sheriff’s Office deputy, Mr. Clements eventually admitted to touching the alleged
victim. (See PSI, p.3.)
The State charged Mr. Clements with one count of lewd conduct with a child under the
age of sixteen (16) years, felony, I.C. §§ 18-1508 and 18-112A. (R., pp.27-28.) He initially
entered a not guilty plea. (R., p.32.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Clements later pleaded
guilty to an amended charge of one count of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen (16)
years felony, I.C. §§ 18-1506 and 18-112A. (R., pp.38-41.) The district court imposed a unified
sentence of fifteen years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.50-51.)
After Mr. Clements participated in a Sex Offender Assessment Group “rider,” the rider
program staff recommended he be placed on probation. (PSI, pp.267-74.) The district court then
suspended Mr. Clements’ sentence and placed him on probation for a period of ten years.
(R., pp.63-67.)
About a year and one-half later, the State filed a Report of Probation Violation alleging
Mr. Clements had violated the terms and conditions of his probation. (R., pp.79-82.) He entered
denials to all the alleged violations. (R., p.87.) Mr. Clements subsequently admitted to violating
his probation by consuming alcohol, using marijuana and hydrocodone, going out shooting with
a rifle, being kicked out of his residences, viewing pornography and exchanging pornographic
images, accessing social media accounts and using a smartphone without permission, having an
unapproved friendship with a thirteen-year-old female, having unapproved sexual relationships
1

All citations to the PSI refer to the 282-page PDF version of the Presentence Report and
its attachments.
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with women, and not taking a polygraph every six months and completing a polygraph that
showed deceptive responses.

(See Tr., p.5, L.3 – p.19, L.17.)

The district court found

Mr. Clements had “made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary decision for which he’s
established a factual basis for each of the admissions that were made.” (Tr., p.19, Ls.18-25.)
During the disposition hearing, Mr. Clements recommended the district court give him
“another chance at probation after a rider, a rider that focuses on his substance abuse rather than
the sex offense.” (Tr., p.65, L.23 – p.66, L.1.) Mr. Clements thought “that he could benefit from
substance abuse treatment and counseling. So we’re asking the Court not to impose the sentence
at this time but to retain jurisdiction and place him in the CAPP or the Cincinnati rider.”
(Tr., p.66, Ls.2-6.)
The State recommended the district court execute Mr. Clements’ sentence. (Tr., p.66,
Ls.12-14.) The district court revoked Mr. Clements’ probation and executed the sentence.
(R., pp.92-93.)
Mr. Clements filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s “Judgment and
Commitment on Conviction of a Probation Violation.” 2

(R., pp.95-97; see R., pp.105-08

(Amended Notice of Appeal).)
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At the same time he filed the Notice of Appeal, Mr. Clements filed a Motion for Reduction of
Sentence, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35. (R., pp.102-03.) After a hearing, the district
court denied the motion. (R., pp.110-11.) In light of the applicable legal standards,
Mr. Clements does not challenge the district court’s denial of the Motion for Reduction of
Sentence on appeal.
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ISSUE
When the district court revoked Mr. Clements’s probation, did the court abuse its discretion by
executing his underlying sentence rather than retaining jurisdiction?

ARGUMENT
When The District Court Revoked Mr. Clements’s Probation, The Court Abused Its Discretion
By Executing His Underlying Sentence Rather Than Retaining Jurisdiction
Mr. Clements asserts the district court, when it revoked his probation, abused its
discretion by executing his underlying sentence rather than retaining jurisdiction. The district
court should have followed Mr. Clements’ recommendation and retained jurisdiction so he could
go on a rider to address his substance abuse problems.
A district court may revoke a defendant’s probation under certain circumstances.
I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603 & 20-222. “A district court’s decision to revoke probation will not be
overturned on appeal absent a showing that the court abused its discretion.” State v. Sanchez,
149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). In reviewing a district court’s discretionary decision, appellate
courts conduct an inquiry “to determine whether the court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion, acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with the applicable
legal standards, and reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Id. at 105-06.
Appellate courts use a two-step analysis in reviewing a probation revocation proceeding.
Id. at 105. First, the appellate court determines “whether the defendant violated the terms of his
probation.” Id. “If it is determined that the defendant has in fact violated the terms of his
probation, the second question is what should be the consequences of that violation.” Id.
Mr. Clements concedes he admitted to violating his probation. (See Tr., p.5, L.3 – p.19,
L.17.) When a probationer admits to a direct violation of her probation agreement, no further
inquiry into the question is required. State v. Peterson, 123 Idaho 49, 50 (Ct. App. 1992). Thus,
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this Court may go to the second step of the analysis and determine whether the district court
abused its discretion by executing Mr. Clements’ underlying sentence rather than retaining
jurisdiction.
Retained jurisdiction is designed “to allow the trial court additional time to evaluate the
defendant’s rehabilitation potential and suitability for probation.” State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho
193, 194 (Ct. App. 1984). “Probation is the ultimate objective sought by a defendant who asks a
court to retain jurisdiction.” Id. (citing State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 567 (Ct. App. 1982)).
Whether to place a defendant on probation is a choice “committed to the sound discretion of the
trial court.” Id. Because probation is at issue, the standard of review for a district court’s
decision on whether to retain jurisdiction is the “clear abuse of discretion” standard, with a focus
on the criteria set forth in I.C. § 19-2521. Id. “Refusal to retain jurisdiction will not be deemed a
‘clear abuse of discretion’ if the trial court has sufficient information to determine that a
suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521.” Id.
Ms. Clements asserts the district court abused its discretion by executing his underlying
sentence rather than retaining jurisdiction. At the disposition hearing, when the district court
asked Mr. Clements if he would have “stopped doing this stuff” if he had not been charged with
a probation violation, he answered, “I would have, yes. I had started to straighten up there
towards the very, very end.” (Tr., p.71, Ls.3-9.) According to Mr. Clements, “I was starting to
pay for my treatment. I was working on staying sober. I was about, I think, at least a week,
week and a half sober before my arrest, and on the day of my arrest, actually, I had an interview
at 4:30 that day at a restaurant.” (Tr., p.71, Ls.8-12.) He “was trying to better myself. Even
though I already had a job, I was seeking for more work.” (Tr., p.71, Ls.12-14.)
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Mr. Clements also explained that he needed substance abuse treatment, because “what I
was focused on when I was out on probation was just spending time drinking whether in a bar or
at a friend’s house or by myself.” (Tr., p.69, Ls.21-25.) When the district court asked why he
thought he could use alcohol on probation and get away with it, he replied that his probation
officer at the time “wasn’t UAing me as much as he should have been.” (Tr., p.70, Ls.4-8.)
Additionally, the district court questioned Mr. Clements about why it took him eighteen
months to have a polygraph exam, when he was required to have regular polygraphs every six
months. (See Tr., p.70, Ls.12-18.) Mr. Clements explained that his probation officer at the time
“wasn’t really disciplining me on any of the probation rules, and he was just kind of—he was
giving me enough slack to hang myself with, so to speak.” (Tr., p.70, Ls.19-22.) As long as the
probation officer did not mention it, Mr. Clements “was just going to kind of sweep it under the
rug and not worry about it.” (Tr., p.70, Ls.23-24.) When Mr. Clements was transferred to
another probation officer, “that’s when everything became stricter, and that’s finally when I had
that polygraph.” (See Tr., p.70, L.25 – p.71, L.2.)
In light of the above, Mr. Clements submits the district court, when it revoked his
probation, abused its discretion by executing his underlying sentence rather than retaining
jurisdiction.

The district court should have followed Mr. Clements’ recommendation and

retained jurisdiction so he could go on a rider to address his substance abuse problems.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Clements respectfully requests that this Court reduce his
sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 23rd day of July, 2018.

/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23rd day of July, 2018, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, electronically as follows:
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
Delivered via e-mail to: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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